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Abstract
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial Law,
Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic University.
Chapter 1 explores the primary means of state ﬁnancing, while focusing on the accumulation of
sovereign debt. It also diﬀerentiates between standard borrowing and debt issuance. It ﬁnishes with
a concise and strictly quantitative representation of Greek Government debt in recent years.
Moving on to the realm of sovereign default, the paper highlights in brief two typical examples; the
Least-Developed-Countries (LDCs) crisis of the '80s and the Argentine Great Depression of 1998-2002.
In the same context however, the central theme of this paper is the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
that burst out in 2009 and part of it still lingers on, with a particular focus on an overview of the legal
framework of both the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (i.e. competencies,
conditionality and the like) and discusses both legal and operational aspects with regard to their -joint-
actions in the struggle to overcome the consequences of the over-indebtedness of ﬁve euro area members
states (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus). Conclusions are drawn in the end.
Keywords: sovereign debt, Eurozone, ECB, IMF
Preface
It is never an easy task to remain detached when writing about recent events whose devastating impact
still taunts -pretty much- your own backyard. I am a Greek lawyer and our profession has taken a huge
beating as a result of the -ongoing- crisis. Nevertheless, I believe that all drawn conclusions and relevant
criticism are grounded solely on facts.
In all honesty, I am compelled to express my gratitude to Dr. Thomas Keijser, whose innovative and
interactive lecturing (yes, students can in fact contribute something to the process !!) back in March of
2017 inspired me to reach out to him for the purposes of my thesis.
Lastly, this paper is dedicated to a group of wonderful people, that I met during my time at IHU and
that I know call "friends", whose spirit, wisdom and profound enthusiasm inspired my work as a student,
a professional, a human being. I can only hope that they will enjoy reading this little story of mine.
A.V., A.V., J.K., A.M., C.M., A.M., C.B., F.B., E.M., V.P., M.P., J.S., A.S., H.T. thank you for an
amazing year !!
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What is the common factor between Russia of 1998, Argentina of 2001 and Greece of 2012? There
is no doubt that the series of events regarding these periods will not go down in the history books of
each country as times of glory, but will rather be regarded as times of great economic depression of such
magnitude that managed to shake their domestic societal and political foundations. From a statistical
point of view, as well as to justify my reference to these speciﬁc countries, it is a fact that Greece,
Argentina and Russia (in that order) constitute the "Top 3" of the largest sovereign defaults to date,
with ﬁgures (in US dollars) in the range of 261 billion, 82 billion and 73 billion respectively, according to
a CNBC report [1].
However, this is merely the- nonetheless high-proﬁle- tip of a timeless iceberg, since debt drama is not
merely a symptom of modern times. Quite the opposite actually, reports of sovereign default may be
traced all the way back to the 16th century. For example, Spain is thought to have defaulted on its debt
for the ﬁrst time during the 1500s, whereas other major countries from the European continent (such
as France, Portugal, Germany) did so repeatedly from the 16th to the 19th century. Latin American
countries and ﬁnally, the Ottoman Empire were also quite often in default during the 1800s [2]. It is,
therefore, clear that such unfortunate events have been documented throughout the globe for centuries,
while it remains a question whether there can be any guarantees as to their prevention in the future.
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Chapter 1
Accumulation of sovereign debt
In the ﬁrst chapter I refer to the diﬀerent mechanisms a state may apply in order to boost public
ﬁnances.
1.1 State's dependency on ﬁnancing
They say money can't buy happiness. Let's just add that it can surely buy everything else, though.
And just as any Average Joe residing in his hometown depends on his monthly income in order to be able
to service his mortgage, enjoy mobility or pay for the kids' tuition, by analogy the same thing applies
for the government that cannot run a country based on good intentions, but on notes and coins. It is
an obligation that spreads beyond the purview of the individual's personal interest, but is vested in the
Heads of State assisted by their cabinets and central bankers to make sure that at all times, there are
suﬃcient amounts of ﬁnancing to fund governmental expenditures, that is to pay public-sector wages and
salaries as well as to invest in education, healthcare, infrastructures etc.
Under normal circumstances, both the revenues as well as the expenditures of any government's annual
budget are calculated in advance and are adhered to throughout the upcoming ﬁscal year, so as to achieve
the preservation of a desired equilibrium. In theory, this may deﬁnitely be music to the ears of any Finance
Minister, however practical applicability has shown that the above-mentioned model is usually wishful
thinking. My point is this; it is more of a rule rather than an exception that a government will ﬁnd itself
in the unpleasant position of need for money and the primary reason for such a predicament is the so-
called revenue shortfall, which leads to a gap between cash expenditures and inﬂows from revenues, such
as those derived from taxation [3], although there are various other sources of income for a government.
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For instance, commodity-based economies rely heavily as a primary means of revenue on their domestic
agricultural production and subsequent exports. The thing is that these countries have to deal with issues
of high volatility due to variable weather or other factors that might aﬀect harvests [4]. So, when in lean
times, they might need to resort to funding in order to cover the hole in their budgets. However, a shortage
in the revenues, something that is usually beyond the control and contrary to the will of the Government,
is not necessarily the only reason that could trigger a need for funding, which may very well be the
result of the government's own volition. So, the government may choose to increase its expenditures,
under the auspices of an expansionary ﬁscal policy which may include several reforms. An indicative
example would be the expansion of the public sector in Greece, hence the generation of new jobs, that
was carried out by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, during his second tenure from 1993 to 1996.
Another objective that would call for a rise in state expenditures could involve an investment plan on the
domestic infrastructure, meaning all the facilities that are mandatory to both the functioning of the state
and the well-being of its citizens, such as roads, bridges, tunnels and sewages as well as establishments
like state schools, hospitals and public houses. It is quite common for such ventures to be treated as
imperative either in the occurrence of previous natural disasters (i.e. earthquakes or hurricanes) or to
deal with the aftermaths of a prolonged armed conﬂict.
With regard to the latter, I believe that, within the territorial conﬁnes of Europe at least, the most
typical case of investments on infrastructure was the need for an overall regeneration of the vast majority
of European countries and economies, due to the detrimental eﬀects of World War II (1939-1945). It was
a time when the political leaders found themselves in desperate need for funding in order to rebuild their
countries from the ashes. This venture was carried out under the auspices of the USA-driven European
Recovery Program (widely known as The Marshall Plan), which remains until today the largest ﬁnancial
program in history, and whose aim was to fund the reconstruction of European countries' infrastructures
in electricity, water, transportation, sanitation etc.
1.2 Means of state ﬁnancing
So, whatever the cause may be (revenue shortfall or an investment policy), the state will in any case
have to ﬁnd the appropriate formula in order to attract ﬁnancing.
The truth is that the list of available possibilities may be summoned up in the three following categories:
a) raising taxation, b) printing (creating) money and c) borrowing and issuing debt. Since the third
category constitutes the focal point of this paper, I will start by brieﬂy referring to the other two.
As regards the ﬁrst category, the government may resort to an increase in taxes of either direct or
indirect nature. Legally speaking, it has the capacity to do so, since it is within the scope of powers
5
vested in the sovereign, that is the legal person that governs its own aﬀairs in its own territory without
outside interference, to enact or choose to reshape its own tax policy [5]. One could, also, hold that
it seems the appropriate technique due to its simplicity in terms of structure and imposition, as it is
common knowledge that taxation in general is the primary source of income for a state, so simply raising
the ﬁgures, from a governments' point of view is not a choice of policy that goes oﬀ the beaten track.
On the other hand, as it was put by the famous American novelist Margaret Mitchell "Death, taxes and
childbirth! There's never any convenient time for any of them" (extract from "Gone with The Wind"),
clearly an increase in taxation will never be met with enthusiasm on behalf of the citizens. On the contrary
it reduces purchasing power, generates higher costs for businesses and leads to an overall less appealing
environment for investments. So, any government should be prepared to bear the socio-political cost. I
believe that one of the very few instances where people responded considerably well to tax increases, comes
from Greece in the '00s, when the Simitis Cabinet imposed a raise on the VAT as part of its economic
adjustment plan on the way to fulﬁlling the Maastricht Criteria so that Greece would be eligible for the
new common currency. So, it was a case of an "end that justiﬁes the means", given that the stake of
making it to the Eurozone was simply too high.
The second category of ﬁnancing means introduces the concept of money creation, meaning an increase
in the circulation of the money supply. So, if existing liquidity does not suﬃce in order to fund the state's
expenditures, then there is the possibility to literally print new notes and coins to that end. However,
such a process raises legal issues concerning the state's legal capacity to print money or simply put,
whether the state bears printing authority and if not, then who does. In order to be able to answer the
question who has the printing authority, one must ﬁrst answer the question who owns, thus has control
over, the currency, since "money" may carry a rather broad meaning, but "printing" of money refers to
"currency", which stricto sensu, comes in the form of notes and coins. So, if the State has ownership
over the currency under which it operates (hence the term "national currency"), then it has the ability
to print it.
However, since any functional administration respects the doctrine of separation of powers" is is the
central bank that has the competency to determine the amount of money that should be in circulation at
all time by either increasing or decreasing liquidity, according to the needs of the economy. For instance,
the United Kingdom uses the sterling as its own national means of exchange, so decisions concerning the
printing and distribution of notes and coins rest upon the Bank of England, which acts as the central
bank within the UK. Similarly, in Switzerland it is the SNB (the Swiss National Bank), operating as the
central bank, that has the same power. To a large extent the same applies to the US which uses the US
dollar as its national currency, nonetheless under a rather hybrid regime, since the Federal Reserve (the
US central bank) may exercise control over the money supply, but technically speaking it is the Treasury
Department that actually prints paper currency and mints coins [6]. I should note that printing money
may provide guarantees that a state will never run out of cash (or go into default), nevertheless cases of
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excessive circulation may very well lead to events of inﬂation (rise of prices), which is rightfully considered
as the worst enemy of ﬁnancial and monetary stability. The setting is completely diﬀerent, though, as
regards states that are members to the Eurozone.
The concept of having a single currency coincides with the fact that the euro is nobody's national
currency, so typically the euro "belongs" to the Eurozone only (for the same reasons, the debt of all
member states is actually debt denominated in a foreign -not domestic- currency, something that has also
been misinterpreted over the years by the public). It was one of the central features of the conversion
of national currencies to the euro, that states would voluntarily assign their monetary sovereignty to the
European Central Bank (ECB), the central bank of the Eurozone. As a result, no Eurozone member
state has the legal capacity to print euros in order to fund its expenditures, since such competence lies
exclusively with the ECB, whose primary task (under Art. 127.1 of the TFEU) is to protect the stability
of the euro against inﬂation. It was because of this reason, that most observers in both the UK and the
USA deemed that the project of an EMU would fail (they referred to it as a "Euro-salad" [8]) , on the
basis that in the event of a crisis in one EMU member state, the loss of ability to devalue the currency
would have negative ramiﬁcations [8].
It appears that raising taxes is legally viable for a government should it be able to absorb the highly
probable negative feedback from society and the subsequent political cost, whereas the ability to print
money goes hand in hand with monetary sovereignty, while the possibility of inﬂation should also be
taken into account. But, what if a state, that is not monetarily sovereign, has already drained the
taxpayers' pockets and can no longer resort to taxation? Then it would have to seek ﬁnancing through
the framework of a lender-borrower (or creditor-debtor) relationship.
1.3 Sovereign debt - borrowing vs. bonds
So, in relation to the third category of ways of ﬁnancing, I shall proceed to what constitutes the core
part of this paper, which is sovereign debt. Otherwise known as "government debt" or "public debt",
simply put it is the debt owed by a government. Basically, it is diﬀerentiated from private debt, which
is debt owed by either individuals or legal persons (i.e. banks), coming from the private sector. With
regard to both sovereign and private debt, there are sub-categories according to the lender's nationality
and legal status. So, lenders may be either situated within the state where the government exercises its
powers or where the enterprise (or individual) has its place of business (hence the term "internal/domestic
indebtedness"), or in another jurisdiction (hence the term "external/foreign indebtedness"), while may
constitute an oﬃcial (public) agency or originate from (private) capital markets [2]. This gives rise to a
very important and topical issue, that is the legal ability of a state to borrow from another state.
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Before getting down to the technicalities, I would like to make a brief remark on the "humanitarian"
features of sovereign debt in order to understand the impact that the debt of a government can have on
society and on the real economy. According to the views of political analysts of ancient times, money
was associated with war. It was more than 2.000 years ago, that Cicero noted [4] "Endless money forms
the sinews of war", so it was the unlimited access to funding that paved the way for a nation to go
to battle. It may be true that there have been examples of countries in recent times where success or
failure in sovereign debt management has meant victory or defeat in their wars, nevertheless, nowadays,
consequences of sovereign debt are limited to a more peaceful and civilized scope.
Basically, today the eﬀect of sovereign borrowing (or debt issuance, which I will explain further on)
on society and on the real economy may be summoned up by the following paradox: Even though a
government may borrow for reasons that are far beyond the personal interest of each taxpayer, it still
hands a piece of the obligation (to repay) to each taxpayer [4]. So, it seems that sovereign debt aﬀects
everyone's life in a society. However, with regard to a handful of institutions, it also works vice versa.
These institutions operate at the heart of every economy and their magnitude is such that their stability
is a prerequisite to the overall stability of a state. The most typical example are banks. Due to their
status as "TBTF" (Too Big To Fail [9] they form the backbone of any functioning economy, and prior
to the Eurozone crisis, it was absolutely certain that every time an overindebted bank was on the brink
of collapsing, the Government would ﬁnd the right formula to prevent such an event by undertaking the
bank's debt. This is why ﬁnancial markets (correctly) tend to regard banking debt as "quasi government
debt".
I will now focus on the mechanisms through which a state borrows, or formally speaking, accumulates
debt. Basically, there are two ways to go about, either in the form of a direct loan or through the issuance
of bonds. The ﬁrst option is not that hard to conceive -both legally and economically-, as it involves the
signing of a typical bilateral loan agreement where one party (the lender) agrees to transfer a speciﬁed
amount of money to its counterparty (the borrower), while the latter undertakes the responsibility to
return that amount plus interest to the ﬁrst party within a speciﬁed period of time. The second option
is set in a more complex background. Bond issuance may also be within the realm of ﬁnancing through
borrowing (indeed, the state does borrow money that needs to be repaid), nonetheless there are diﬀerences,
with regard to terminology (a government issues debt only in the form of a bond), longer maturities and
their ability to be traded.
There is, however, a fundamental condition, of both legal and economic nature, that needs to be met so
as to conﬁrm a state's eligibility to issue a bond, and that is market access. So, the ability to issue bonds
within the ﬁnancial markets is not a self-explanatory right of the state, quite the contrary actually. The
example of Greece, a country that managed to regain access to ﬁnancial markets only last July following
an absence of three years, underpins the principle that only states that adhere to a minimum of sound
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public ﬁnances, stability, creditworthiness and are not under any type of supervision by international
institutions, might have a chance to sell their bonds purchased in the markets.
1.4 Greek Government debt in numbers from the drachma to the
euro
For the ﬁnal segment of this ﬁrst chapter, and just to provide an example of accumulation of sovereign
debt in ﬁgures (either as an absolute value or as the ratio of sovereign debt to GDP), I shall swiftly retrace
Greece's contemporary history of borrowing, from the end of World War II (1945) to the beginning of
the '00s and the convergence of its national currency to the euro 1.1. Since the Eurozone ﬁnancial crisis
as a whole, constitutes a separate chapter of this paper, I shall make no reference to the years prior to
and during the Greek crisis, for the purposes of this part.
Figure 1.1: The drachma against the euro
Source: http://www.alamy.com
It is no exaggeration to say that Greece was born in debt, as the modern Greek State (following the
independence of 1821) was founded carrying the heavy burden of having to repay the loans that were
given in order to fund the Revolution, and has remained indebted ever since.
With regard to contemporary times, the ﬁrst large ﬁnancial package came under the auspices of the
Marshall Plan (1948-1952), where Greece's piece of the pie is estimated at $376 million. However, money
was given partly in the form of a loan, and the rest were considered as a grant by the US, probably as a
means to increase their inﬂuence in the European continent against that of the Soviet Union. So, only
part of the 376 million is calculated in the overall external debt of the country.
9
From 1955 to 1963 (under the prime-ministership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the elder), Greece
concluded 28 external loans in total, worth $406 million. The ratio of debt to GDP (that is, the Gross
Domestic Product of a country, meaning the total value of goods produced and services provided in a
country during one year) in 1963 was estimated at a mere 14%.
During the Greek Military Dictatorship, commonly known as "The Junta" (1967-1974), the country
switched from external to domestic borrowing, typical of a dictatorial government and its politics of
profound introspection. In ﬁgures, Greek domestic debt quadrupled during the 7-year span whereas
external loans reached a modest $73 million, while there was also an (sustainable) increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio, reaching 22% by the time the Junta had fallen from power.
The political changeover (accurate Greek term being "metapolitefsi") was accompanied by the rein-
statement of the accession agreement between Greece and the European Community, that was already
in place since 1961 but was suspended due to the Dictatorship. Practically, this sparkled the momentum
for Greece to regain its access to foreign capital. As a result, 24 major foreign loans were given (the ﬁrst
of which was agreed immediately with a consortium of foreign banks estimated at $100 million), mostly
by the French Government and several foreign institutions and banks, whereas a 3-year ﬁnancial aid plan
was signed with the German Government [8].
In general, Greece maintained sustainable levels of debt-to-GDP ratios, ranging from 20 to 27%. The
'80s however, was a completely diﬀerent story. Mostly under the Prime-ministership of Andreas Papan-
dreou, in order to service the ﬁrst expansion of the public sector (mainly through the nationalization of
a number of companies), the ratio grew from 23% in 1980 to 47,8% in 1985, and ﬁnally reaching 80% in
1990.
During the tenure of the successor government under Konstantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993), the ratio hit
a staggering 110%, however this is attributed by the majority of specialists to the retroactive integration
of "hidden" debts of its predecessor.
The Greek debt-to-GDP ratio remained in the ﬁeld of 110 to 114% until the end of the '90s, a time
that coincides with Greece's ﬁscal adjustment program in accordance with the Maastricht convergence
criteria. With regard not to the height but to the nature of the debt, once again I should stress out
the legal consequence of the adoption of the common currency, that ever since the adoption of the euro,
Greece's (as all other Member States') debt is considered as debt denominated in a foreign currency.
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Chapter 2
Cases of Sovereign Default
For the purposes of this chapter, I will discuss two examples of sovereign default.
2.1 Sovereign default
Which are the feasible solutions in cases where things go south, in terms that the sovereign borrower
accumulates so much debt that eventually is led to default?
Since my main focus is territorially limited to the Eurozone, I would ﬁrst like to refer, in a very concise
manner, to two cases of sovereign defaults and the application of similar resolution techniques, that may
had taken place outside the European continent, but nevertheless attracted global attention. These were
a) the LDCs (Least-Developed Countries) debt crisis of the 1980's, and b) the 1998-2002 Argentine Great
Depression.
On an introductory note, there is a notable legal particularity in cases where the borrower (or debt
issuer) is a state, separating this hybrid creditor/debtor relationship from any other type of loan (or
bond holding). That is the lack of enforcement provisions. Normally, when both parties are either legal
persons or individuals, there is always a standardized procedure in place under which the creditor may
enforce its claim against the borrower that has defaulted on its debt, whereas if the latter is a state, the
creditor is deprived of such powers meaning that it cannot force the state to repay its debt. In the past,
especially in the period of 1870-1914, a creditor would resort to the so-called "gunboat policy", meaning
that creditors used military power to enforce debt contracts. They blockaded, cannonaded, even invaded
nations that refused to honour ﬁnancial commitments [10]. Today, attempts to secure repayment by
gunboat diplomacy are considered a bit "outre" [4]. To begin with, a potential creditor might very well
feel some uncertainty since repayment by the sovereign borrower depends on the latter's own animus to
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honour its commitments.
2.2 The LDCs crisis
With regard to the LDCs crisis that escalated mostly in Latin American countries -such as Brazil,
Uruguay and Venezuela-, sovereign debt was accumulated through loans granted by USA and British
commercial banks to bolster their commodity-based economies (exports in sugar, coﬀee, cocoa etc.).
Even though at ﬁrst, the borrowing countries were able to service their debts, nevertheless the second oil
crisis in the '80s consequently led to the dropping of prices in commodities, so the LDCs found themselves
in default. As a solution to this predicament, a largely innovative plan was set in motion, introduced by
by U.S. Treasury Secretary at the time Nicholas Brady (hence the term "Brady Plan") and orchestrated
with the collaboration of the London Club (informal group of private creditors on the international stage),
that consisted of a debt-exchange agreement between the creditor banks and the sovereign borrowers,
where (unrepaid) bank loans were exchanged for bonds issued by the latter under more preferable terms,
such as longer maturity dates or zero interest. So, it was more of a debt-forgiveness rather than a debt-
exchange deal in return for a promise for structural reforms by the countries in order to re-adjust their
economies, since existing debt was restructured much to the beneﬁt of the borrower, even though to
some extent the plan was beneﬁcent for the banks as well, as they managed to write the debt oﬀ their
balance sheets replacing it with tradeable ﬁnancial instruments. Albeit the controversy regarding the
lessons learnt from Brady bonds in international ﬁnancial aﬀairs (sceptics believe that such possibilities
encourage countries to strategically run interest arrears to commercial banks, whereas the World Bank
considers that the Brady Plan "has strengthened the incentives for member governments to embark on,
or sustain growth-oriented adjustment programs") [13], it is true that ever since their ﬁrst appearance 30
years ago, they have been established as basic instruments for debt-restructuring.
2.3 The Argentine Great Depression
The Argentine Great Depression of 1998 to 2002 2.1 (comprising the 2nd largest default in history when
the country announced its $82 billion default in November 2001 ) sprung from diﬀerent grounds, as it was
the result of two main factors, one being the adoption of a rather oﬀbeat exchange rate regime, in 1991,
whereby the value of the peso (Argentine national currency) was set one-to-one equal to that of the US
dollar [2] and the other, an excessive accumulation of government debt in the form of bonds denominated
mostly (around 70%) in US dollars. The combination of the two represented a huge potential risk, since if
ever the national currency were devalued and one peso no longer purchased one but 0,5 or 0,25 US dollars,
then immediately the numerator in the debt to GDP ratio would be doubled or quadrupled. Eventually,
it was the realization of such bleak scenario that called for a debt resolution mechanism, that would
resemble the one applied in the case of the LDCs. In particular, two debt restructurings were carried
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Figure 2.1: Argentinian protest against poverty
Source: https://sites.google.com/site/economiccrisishome/feature-article-two
out, one in 2005 and the other in 2010, where existing defaulted bonds (of zero value) were swapped for
new ones (whose value gradually rose) under more preferable terms for the issuer, resulting in 93% of
Argentine government bonds being restructured whereas the remainder 7% of holdout bondholders being
repaid in full by 2016. It is also worth noting that part of the agreement for the ﬁrst debt restructuring
was that the loans given by the IMF would be returned in full, as no haircut in IMF loans is in any way
permissible, for reasons that I will refer to in the relevant chapter.
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Chapter 3
The role of the ECB in the Eurozone
crisis
I will now move on to the topical issue of ECB involvement in the euro area crisis, with a particular
focus on the controversy regarding the legality of its actions.
3.1 The Eurozone crisis
The economic crisis of the ﬁve Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus)
that broke out in 2009 and still lingers on for some, is the epitome of a sovereign debt crisis, one that
sprung from the accumulation of enormous amounts of debt. Notwithstanding the overall pressures that
the currency has sustained, nevertheless we cannot refer to the crisis as a currency crisis.
The causes that sparkled the crisis may be debatable to some extent, however some basic common key
factors are [8]:
1. the side eﬀects of global recession attributed to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008 that originated from
the US subprime mortgage market,
2. the divergence between Northern and Southern member states when it comes to the import/export
equilibrium (Southern countries' imports exceed domestic production, hence the need for loans),
3. the low interest rate stipulated in the ECB's mandate that may have been appropriate for the
German economy, but clearly unsuitable for other economies, such as Greece, where this steep
drop, compared to interest rates prior to the EMU, eventually resulted in an unprecedented credit
bubble,
14
4. the deﬁciencies, in terms of weak corporate governance, lack of responsibility and ineﬀectiveness
that characterized both the public and private services sectors of these states, and
5. the belated realisation and response in relation to the magnitude of the crisis, since Eurozone
Finance Ministers as well as the ECB itself were in denial for a long period of time, considering
that problems were only temporary and that states could always seek to reﬁnance on their debts
through the ﬁnancial markets, based on the notion that government bonds regardless of state of
origin would be highly appreciated due to the common currency (i.e. same yield for both German
and Greek bonds).
These undisputed factors are illustrated in all ﬁve member states. For instance, the main factor behind
the Irish debt crisis has been the devastating boom-bust cycle (a period of rapid growth that is violently
replaced by severe recession) in the Irish property market [14] in connection to the Great Recession of
2008 and the convictions of executives of the six largest banks for banking scandals such as accounting
fraud etc. In addition, a central feature that encompassed the Eurozone crisis in its totality is how
originally banking (private) debt gradually evolved into government debt, through recapitalisations ne-
cessitated by the "TBTF" theory that I have analysed in the ﬁrst chapter. Even though it falls under
the category of a "sovereign debt crisis", nevertheless to some extent it sprung from the collapsing (or
imminent collapsing) of the relevant national banking systems. So, Ireland paid the price for having to
foot the bill for the accumulated international bond borrowings of the Bank of Ireland, as Spain did for
Bankia, Greece for Piraeus Bank etc.
3.2 The European Central Bank (ECB)
Figure 3.1: The ECB's headquarters in Frankfurt
Source: https://www.strategic-culture.org
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The ﬁrst step towards creating the ECB was a decision taken in 1988 to build an Economic and
Monetary Union, on the path to a higher degree of European integration: free capital movements within
Europe, a common monetary authority and a single monetary policy across the euro-area countries. It
was European Commission President Jacques Delors who envisaged the project (hence the term "Delors
Report") [15], a visionary politician dedicated to the notion of an absolute pan-European union, to whom
the title of "the architect of the internal market" should rightfully be attributed. The report presupposes
three stages towards a potential economic and monetary union, and was so well received by European
leaders of the time, that the proposed timeline is identical to the relevant three-stage plan stipulated in
the Treaty of Maastricht.
The ECB itself 3.1, founded in 1994, was the central ﬁgure of Stage II. Interestingly though, it was
established under the name "European Monetary Institute", without any reference whatsoever to the
term bank or its derivatives. The rationale for such choice of wording is linked to the timeless matter
of sovereignty submission. The newly-founded institution should not give rise to accusations that it has
come to either undermine or even replace the authority and the competences of the national central banks
(hereinafter referred to as "NCBs"), mostly that of the German Bundesbank, which would deﬁnitely take
exception to such intentions. Ever since the inception of the EU and the relevant institutions, the level
of voluntary submission of sovereignty, whether political, monetary or judicial was never a unanimous
decision, but was rather debated between the traditionally "pro-European" and "sceptical" states. For
instance, the French have always displayed zealous support for an overall union, the most recent example
being the transformation proposal of President Macron for a "profound political integration" including
the placement of an EU Finance Minister, whereas the British seem to value their sovereignty more, as
they opt-out of several proposals for further integration (let alone Brexit!). However, it is for the same
reasons that until present day, the United States central bank is labelled as the "US Federal Reserve",
and not as a bank.
The ECB is part of the group of the seven major EU institutions (alongside the European Commission,
the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the EU
and the Court of Auditors), empowered with the competence to deﬁne and implement monetary policy
for the euro area and a primary task, under article 127 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union), to safeguard the value of the common currency and maintain price stability. Although
there is no formal strict deﬁnition of the term "monetary policy", broadly deﬁned it is the process by
which a central bank asserts control over the quantity of money in circulation in an economy [16].
The legal basis for ECB competences (a very topical issue in the context of the Eurozone crisis) and
operations consists of the TFEU (articles 3(1)(c), 119, 123, 127-134, 138-144, 219 and 282-284) and the
ESCB Statute, annexed to the TFEU as Protocol 4.
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In order to fully comprehend the ECB's place in the hierarchy of the European multiplex and its
interplay with either national or supranational authorities, one needs to take note of the following organi-
zational aspects of the EU: In terms of geography, the European continent contains 49 states, of which 28
(Britain's exit is still pending) are EU Member States. Out of these 28, only 19 states having adopted the
euro as their common (not national, as I have already explained in chapter I) currency, form the Eurozone.
The ECB is the central bank of the Eurozone. Together with the NCBs of all EU Member States they
form a) the ESCB (European System of Central Banks), when it comes to conducting standard monetary
policy operations (to which I shall refer later on), and b) the relatively recent SSM (Single Supervisory
Mechanism), for the purposes of supervising systemically important commercial banks (also, explained
below). Also, through the co-operation of the ECB with the NCBs of only Eurozone member states
(the so-called "ins" as opposed to the "outs", which are the NCBs of EU-but not Eurozone- member
states), comes the Eurosystem. As regards its interaction with other institutions, articles 130 and 282
of the TFEU provide the ECB with all functional, ﬁnancial and personal independence, meaning that it
is not obliged to receive any sort of instructions from e.g. the European Commission. The benchmark
that set a precedent for any future interference with the works of the ECB, was an ECJ ruling (the
"OLAF case") that corroborated the level of independence by holding that "the draftsmen of the EC
Treaty clearly intended to ensure that the ECB should be in a position to carry out independently the
tasks conferred upon it by the Treaty [17]. In fact, the prevailing view is that the ECB began its life as
"the most independent central bank in history" [18],something that is reﬂected by the decision to locate
its headquarters in Frankfurt, as a symbol of both independence from politics and the ﬁght for monetary
stability (the Bundesbank is also located in Frankfurt, and the Germans are known for holding sacred
the prevention of inﬂation). On the other hand, to counterbalance this wide range of discretion with the
risk of abuse, a series of liability, accountability and most importantly, transparency requirements are
imposed on the ECB vis-a-vis other EU institutions, to supplement its "natural" limiter which is the
constant pursuit of the objectives set out in the ECB's mandate. Accordingly, the NCBs enjoy the same
level of independence vis-a-vis other domestic authorities (e.g. the Greek Governor's tenure may not be
renewed, so as to prevent any political inﬂuence), counterbalanced by similar transparency requirements.
3.3 The ECB prior, during and following the Eurozone crisis
It seems that albeit its start-up role as an independent central bank with a rather narrow mandate
to ﬁght inﬂation and protect the value of the euro (strict adherence to monetary policy actions), the
ECB, during the bleak times of the crisis, managed to evolve into a dominant force towards the goal of
avoiding the ﬁnancial meltdown of overindebted states. However, objections were raised from diﬀerent
voices within the Union, as to the competence of the ECB, since economic policy is still subject to
national sovereignty, meaning that member states have reserved their right to exercise it through their
collaboration. Notwithstanding that the end purpose of all ECB initiatives was to prevent the breakdown
of the Eurozone and to preserve the common currency, there are doubts as to the legality of these actions,
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coupled with the question whether the ECB exceeded its legal mandate. I will now present a brief overview
of the distinct segments of ECB operations in the years of the Eurozone crisis.
3.4 The ECB, member of the "Troika"
Deriving from the Russian meaning "group of 3", the Troika 3.2 has been a decision group, operating
under the enhanced cooperation of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and
the ECB, for the purpose of combatting the sovereign debt crisis of the ﬁve member states. Its modus
operandi was to negotiate with representatives of the states in trouble the terms and conditions of bail-out
packages, that included the commitment (of the states) to economic adjustment programs based on the
adoption of harsh austerity measures. Apart from the substantive part of the work, I believe it was the
style that the Troika chose to conduct its business (as always, blown out of proportion by the media) that
gave rise to social unrest and protests in countries like Greece, where the public opposed the presence
of foreigners in suits waltzing down ministerial corridors, contemplating on the next cut in salaries or
wages. In any case, the Troika was the one that signed for the following bail-outs [19]:
Bail-Outs Recipient Amount(in billions) Date
1 Ireland 85 November '10
2 Greece 110 May '10
3 Greece 130 July-October '11*
4 Portugal 78 May '11
5 Spain 100 '12
*in the form of reduced lending rates and extended debt maturities.
3.5 The ECB' s asset-purchase programmes
[16] In a ﬁscally sound European environment, articles 18-20 of the ESCB Statute provide the standard
mechanisms attributed to the ECB for conducting monetary policy. These are a) open-market transac-
tions, b) standing facilities and c) reserve requirements, the most important of which are the ﬁrst. So,
it is through the -alternatively titled- market operations, that the ECB avoids inﬂation by controlling
the circulation of currency in the Eurozone, or simply put, the amount of liquidity available to the real
economy. The alternative solution to avoid inﬂation would be to regulate the activity instead (i.e. quotas
on the amount of production), however in the 21st century, such anti-democratic policies only apply
to countries like North Korea, where people are truly convinced that the country's leader maintains an
open communication channel with dolphins. So, if activity were low and the ECB wished to inject the
economy with liquidity, it would purchase bonds from the commercial banks of the Eurosystem, whereas
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if activity had reached unsustainable levels, the ECB would provide the banks with the right incentives to
sell them the bonds, so as to decrease liquidity. It is worth noting that these transactions are conducted
on a consensus basis, as the ECB will attempt to aﬀect the market by either increasing or lowering the
interest rates.
However, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis took its toll on growth and economic activity in the area,
to such an extent that neither domestic measures nor the standard market operations of the ECB would
suﬃce in order to reinstate previous levels of growth. The thing with the open-market transactions is
that their success is dependent on a chain of events, labelled as the "transmission" of the ECB's monetary
policy -in particular, its interest rate policy- to the real economy. Simply put, if the ECB purchases a
bond from one of the few eligible large commercial banks (the ECB does not transact with every bank) at
X% rate, then the counterparty bank should not charge a higher rate when it lends its funds to another
(smaller) commercial bank ("inter-bank lending"), so that the latter is both suﬃciently capitalised and in
a position to provide loans (at the same rate again) to businesses and consumers. As a result of the crisis,
inter-bank lending suﬀered a major blow, since large eligible banks that had previously acquired liquidity
from the ECB, would either refrain from lending to the other banks or charge extremely high rates, due
to the perceived risk that the loans will be repaid either because of the adversities of the speciﬁc bank or
the overall uncertainty regarding that bank's country of incorporation. As a consequence, money never
made it to the end consumer, hence a barren land in terms of economic activity. So, in response, the
ECB introduced a package of non-standard monetary policy measures, collectively labelled "enhanced
credit support". [16] The plan was for the ECB to intervene directly in the money market with a mission
to decrease the risk in inter-bank lending by purchasing, thus removing from their balance sheets, risky
assets from the commercial banks, so that they would regain access to funding via inter-bank lending,
and ultimately provide loans of their own, generating investments, growth and an increase of the inﬂation
rate close to (but below) 2%.
The ﬁrst program was introduced in May 2010 under the title of Securities Markets Programme (SMP),
according to which the NCBs or the ECB could either purchase a) sovereign debt instruments issued by
Eurozone states, but only in the secondary market or b) debt instruments issued by private entities in
both the primary and the secondary market. Unlike ordinary market operations, the purpose of the ECB
was not to inject the economy with new liquidity, but to release amounts of existing liquidity from the
reserves of the large eligible banks to the real economy through the intermediary banks.
Mr. Draghi's -ECB President- public commitment to "do whatever it takes to protect the euro" in July
2012 paved the way for the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme to succeed the SMP in
September of the same year, with a framework solely consisting of purchasing sovereign bonds issued by
Eurozone member states, under the condition that the state would be subject to a programme ﬁnanced
by either the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or the (newly-founded) European Stability
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Mechanism (ESM). The ECB's initial press release was quite ambiguous as to whether it would restrict
itself to the secondary market or not, and it was only after the delivery of the Opinion of the Attorney
General of the ECJ- following a preliminary reference made by the German Constitutional Court to the
ECJ on the basis of a challenge against the OMT programme brought before the GCC- that the ECB
made a ﬁrm decision to buy the sovereign bonds in the secondary market. [20] The OMT programme was
carried out in four separate segments: the covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP), the asset-backed
securities purchase programmes (ABSPP), the public sector purchase programme (PSPP), widely known
as Quantitative Easing (QE) -to which Greece is still struggling to gain access- and the corporate sector
purchase programme (CSPP).
3.6 The Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
By deﬁnition, ELA occurs when the NCB of a Eurozone member state provides central bank money
(in the form of a secured loan) to a solvent ﬁnancial institution facing acute liquidity problems. Basically,
it acts as the lender of last resort for banks. So, typically the ELA may not fall under the scope of
rescue operations for states -given that the sole beneﬁciaries are banks (private entities)- nevertheless,
the interrelated nature of banking and government debt dictates an approach that through the prevention
of banking meltdown, the ELA kept states in their feet starting from August 2007. This is why, during
the Eurozone crisis, negotiations with the ECB, as regards ELA provision, were held at a governmental
level and not with the Governing Council of the concerned banks.
Two conditions need to be satisﬁed in order for ELA eligibility and these are [21]:
1. the credit institution is solvent at the time of the provision of ELA, and
2. the credit institution is experiencing temporary liquidity diﬃculties.
So, a combination of the two conditions outlines a situation where a bank cannot honour its obligations
neither through its own resources nor through market borrowing, but may construct a plan under which
a solution is viable in the foreseeable future, because the ECB, whose aim is to prevent potential negative
systemic repercussions will only release ELA funds if it is satisﬁed that the funds will be recovered in
full.
From a legislative point of view, it is a procedure administered by the NCBs since national legislation
determines that the NCB will decide on the granting of ELA while undertaking all relevant risks and
costs aﬃliated to it. On the other hand, the ECB maintains its supervisory functions and, according
to article 14(4) of the ESCB Statute, may intervene at any time if it ﬁnds that the ELA provision will
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"interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB". So, in practice, the ﬁnal decision rests with the
ECB.
During the summer of 2015, the ECB's handlings of the Greek debt crisis added a supplementary note
to its existing terms of conditionality regarding ELA provision. Such note may not constitute statute
law, nonetheless it is a condition of utmost importance in cases similar to Greece's, and that is an explicit
commitment by the respective state to abstain from any action that would jeopardise its participation in
the EMU. In sum, due to the general uncertainty against the background of a potential haircut on the
depositor's savings or a Grexit, deposit withdrawals had skyrocketed and as result bank reserves were
drained. The lifeline for keeping the banking system running was the personal guarantee of Mr. Draghi
himself that he would continue to support Greek banks as long as Greece pledged itself to abstain from
any action that would jeopardise its participation in the EMU, including a rejection of the signing of a
new memorandum of understanding (as the existing one had lapsed). So, when the Greek Government
called for a referendum asking the electorate body whether to accept the 3rd MOU proposed by the Troika
or not, it did in fact endanger the future of Greece's participation in the EMU. In response, Greek banks
were cut oﬀ from ELA provision and capital controls were imposed by the Greek Government in order
to sustain the amounts withdrawn. So, contrary to the oﬃcial rhetoric that "the ECB was responsible
for the capital controls and the closing of the banks, the reality is that the President himself exhausted
all legal bases of the ECB to keep Greece on its feet, in return for a promise to wipe out any Grexit
talks. Personally, it strikes me that time and again, former Greek Finance Minister Mr. Varoufakis
has declared that he was not aware of the ECB's condition for ELA provision when his government was
announcing the referendum. It seems rather as an evasive tactic grounded on legal advice, because he had
acknowledged that he was aware of the ECB's conditionality, he would deﬁnitely be criminally prosecuted
for jeopardising the very existence of the national banking system. To justify my point, at the time the
ELA was cut, all existing ELA loans became payable on demand (even though the ECB chose not to
enforce its right) while neither a bail-out (Greece was not ﬁnanced at the time, since the last programme
had lapsed and a new one had not been signed), nor a bail-in option (bank reserves were drained) were
available. So, it does not take much to understand the magnitude of the potential risks.
3.7 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism (SRM) and the Bank Recovery and Reso-
lution Directive (BRRD) - The Banking Union, a product of
post-crisis management
In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, national and supranational authorities were faced with the
challenge of laying the foundation stone of safeguarding the union from basically two things [22]:
21
1. 1) segmented banking regulation and supervision on the one hand, and the epidemic eﬀect on the
whole area triggered by the problematic banking sector of one member state, on the other
2. taxpayers footing the bill for collapsing banks, through massive governmental bail-outs.
This called for the adoption of measures of both prudential and corrective nature. With regard to the
ﬁrst, the Heads of States agreed on the voluntary transfer of supervision of all systemically important
banks to the ECB (working closely with the NCBs). The underlying idea was since the ECB will be
called upon to lend money to a failing bank, then it should also be the one to ensure that the same
rules applied to all banks regardless of jurisdiction and to monitor their health on a daily basis, so as to
tackle any problems early on and to prevent the need to intervene as a lender of last resort. At the time,
there was a so-called "mismatch of responsibility and accountability" since the ECB would be summoned
to pay the bill for mishaps that occurred on someone else's watch. As a result, the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) came into force in 2014 with a mission to supervise large systemic banks (the rest
remained under domestic supervision) and to ensure that they complied with EU banking rules in terms
of borrowing, lending, investing, reserving a minimum capital etc.
However, no piece of prudential regulation could ever ward oﬀ all risks, so there was a necessity
for corrective legislation to supplement the SSM and provide a centralized resolution system for credit
institutions [23] in cases where a bank faced imminent danger. So, the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) was adopted in order to ensure that a failing bank would be resolved based on the mechanisms
of a bail-in, meaning that the losses of the bank would be borne internally by its shareholders and other
creditors (i.e. depositors) through the orderly write-down of liabilities, so that taxpayers would no longer
have to pay the bill (as in a bail-out procedure). The appropriate tools that would be applied in each
case where prescribed by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the ﬁnal piece of the
Banking Union puzzle. As regards depositors in particular, notwithstanding they too would be aﬀected,
the BRRD, in align with the general doctrine of "deposit protection", provided that a) deposits of up to
100.000 euros were secured and b) deposits exceeding that limit would only be aﬀected if all other classes
of creditors were exhausted ﬁrst.
3.7.1 Criticism and justiﬁcations for ECB operations
Arguably, the ECB has been subjected to a considerable amount of scrutiny, while there are views
that some of its tactics should be discarded as either unlawful in nature or because the ECB -allegedly-
overstepped its mandate.
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3.8 Participation in the Troika
Its pivotal role in the design of ﬁnancial aid packages for over-indebted states has raised both legal
and political controversy due to increased interference in matters of national sovereignty. A report
[24] by Transparency International (a non-governmental organization that combats global corruption)
accuses the ECB of taking advantage of its operational independence vis-a-vis other EU Institutions
while insuﬃcient transparency requirements cannot compensate for that overlap. Others speak of an
arbitrary interpretation of article 127 TFEU ("support the general economic policies in the Union").
The article in question authorizes the ECB to provide technical assistance and advice on programmes for
countries under ﬁnancial stress. The oﬃcial version was that the ECB does not participate in the decision
making on programmes and that these decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers and the IMF, while
the ECB is rather part of the decision shaping process. [25] However, in practice the ECB's intervention
was much wider. In fact, in some cases it negotiated directly with the states (i.e. talks with Greece and
Ireland on the ELA and QE, and with Spain as regards its conditions for continuing to purchase Spanish
Government bonds), without any prior consultation with other Institutions.
Figure 3.2: Christine Lagarde, Jean Claude Juncker and Mario Draghi
Source: http://www.ieﬁmerida.gr
My personal view is notwithstanding that the ECB did veer into political activity, such innovative
techniques were necessitated ﬁrst of all by the fact that at the time of the crisis, there was no governance
framework in place to negotiate and monitor adjustment programmes, whereas the Eurozone itself was
not even an institution with legal competencies (like the EU) but its operations were based on the
collaboration of member states. So, someone coming from the Eurozone area had to step up. Secondly, it
was the states themselves that realized that a domestic treatment for their condition was not feasible, so
they asked for external help, which implies a certain level of voluntary submission of ﬁnancial sovereignty
from the beginning. Thirdly, I believe that the participation of the ECB in the Troika was mandatory
simply because of the ECB's expertise. The crisis caused a major market turbulence in the euro area, a
ﬁeld that deﬁnitely falls under the scope of the ECB's line of work (i.e. bonds). In that sense I would
dare to take my point a step further and say, given that concerns about the IMF's (a non-European
institution) participation were eventually dropped on the basis of its own experience as a lender of last
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resort, that if one party's participation in the Troika were to be considered as redundant, that would be
the European Commission's and neither of the other two.
3.9 ELA provision
There are two main legal concerns regarding the ELA; its interplay with a) EU State Aid (Articles
107-109 TFEU) and b) with moral hazard.
ELA provision may in fact be treated as state aid subject to the notiﬁcation and authorisation prin-
ciple and a potential rejection by the European Commission, unless the conditions set out in the 2013
Commission's Banking Communication are cumulatively satisﬁed. These are a) ELA is an exceptional
measure granted to cases of a temporarily illiquid yet solvent credit institution, b) ELA is granted as a
loan backed by collateral, c) penalty rates are in order, and d) the central bank provides ELA without
any interference, in the form of guarantees, by the state. [21]
On the other hand, the provision of ELA may also raise concerns in terms of "moral hazard", as
commercial banks may be inclined to risky transactions based on the assumption that a safety net will
always be there to bail them out. The ECB itself has highlighted that the ELA should not be regarded as
a primary means of supporting ﬁnancial stability, while other requirements may also provide grounds for
justiﬁcation, such as the fact that the ELA is provided to few chosen banks under relatively unfavourable
terms and does not in any way replace sound and prudent banking practices. However, the primary
means of tackling moral hazard risks is the strategy of "constructive ambiguity", according to which the
ECB will not publicly disclose the exact criteria and conditions for having access to the ELA, but will
opt for a less transparent procedure in order to prevent the downsides of moral hazard [21]
3.10 OMT- The Gauweiler case
[16] The most controversial aspect of ECB operations in the context of the Eurozone crisis was the
OMT programme, which resulted in litigation. Following the ECB press release of September 2012 on the
launching of the OMT programme, a challenged was brought against it before the German Constitutional
Court by a number of German petitioners on the bases that a) the ECB exceeded its mandate b) the
OMT was in breach of article 123(1) TFEU and c) the OMT infringed the German Constitutional Law.
The GCC held that the OMT was in fact in breach of national law, nonetheless (for the ﬁrst time in its
history) made a preliminary reference to the ECJ to determine the programme's compatibility with EU
law. In particular, the questions were:
1. If article 119 TFEU accords member states the competence to exercise economic policies within
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the Union and a combination of article 127 TFEU and articles 17-24 ESCB Statute leads to the
conclusion that the ECB is competent to exercise purely monetary policy powers, then is the ECB
acting ultra vires? in other words, is the pursuit of price stability limited to standard monetary
policy measures or could the ECB go beyond that?
2. If article 123(1) TFEU prohibits direct purchases by the ECB of bonds issued by the member
states (monetary ﬁnancing), then is the ECB acting in breach of this article through its intention
to purchase sovereign bonds held in the reserves of credit institutions?
The petitioners favoured strict adherence to article 123, meaning that the ECB could never be allowed
to purchase bonds issued by member states. They also maintained the scope of article 127 encompassed
standard monetary operations only, while all other activities remained matters of economic policy exer-
cised solely by the states.
The ECB submitted that it had no interest in exercising economic policy, but the OMT programme
was simply a product of market necessities that could not be serviced through ordinary measures. Over-
indebted states had lost market access due to skyrocketing yields, while inter-bank lending had collapsed
due to all reasons I have already referred to previously (see section The ECB's asset purchase programmes)
and overall, investors were foreseeing a breakdown of the euro area. It also interpreted article 123 as
prohibiting all direct purchases of sovereign bonds, whereas its purpose was to purchase bonds only in the
secondary market following a minimum time gap since the ﬁrst issuance of the bond with a commitment
to not announce a priori its purchasing intentions.
On January 14th 2015, the Attorney General delivered his opinion (see case C-62/14). In brief, he
acknowledged the diﬀerentiation between the primary and the secondary market and the requirement for
a state to be in an adjustment program. He also held that the OMT programme could be justiﬁed under
the principle of solidarity (a basic feature of general economic policy that may not be exercised by the
ECB, but under article 127, its task is to support it), so that if one state is on the verge of an economic
catastrophe, then this ought to be considered as putting at risk the whole Union. However, he did urge
the ECB to withdraw itself from any parallel programme granting ﬁnancial support to the issuing state,
should the ECB wish to purchase its bonds. In simple terms, this meant that the ECB would have to
leave the Troika. Additionally, the AG emphasized the need for respect towards the principles of reason
and proportionality, both of which are of fundamental importance in the EU legal framework.
The ECJ ruling (see case C-62/14), published on June 16th 2015, was in broad terms aligned with
the ECB's submissions about market necessity. The Court chose not to focus that much on the measure
itself and its legal aspects, but to draw comparisons between the objectives of the programme on the one
hand and the respective treaty provision on the other. The ECJ held that the ECB is free to indirectly
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pursue goals of economic policy, granting the ECB much more than a merely supporting role (article 127
TFEU), as long as its main objective is that of monetary policy, namely of price stability. [16]
It is my personal belief that the ECJ was very right in doing so, since it was a matter of "desperate
times calling for desperate measures", but in a temporary and purely exceptional fashion, since nowadays
there are standard mechanisms (ESM, SSM, SRM) of both precautionary and corrective nature operative
within the Eurozone and capable of dealing with any similar events in the future.
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Chapter 4
The role of the IMF in the Eurozone
crisis
The ﬁnal chapter of this paper is dedicated to the participation of the IMF in the ﬁnancial aid programs
implemented for the purposes of rescuing over-indebted Eurozone member states, while special attention
is given to the Greek case.
4.1 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
As a small token of history, the IMF was founded in 1944 and became operative two years later,
headquartered in Washington DC 4.1 ever since. It was set up under the auspices of the Bretton Woods
System (1944) that also foresaw the creation of two other international organizations; the International
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Trade Organization (ITO), a
predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The original purpose of the IMF was to promote
international monetary cooperation, but more speciﬁcally, its mandate was to maintain the good order
of the Bretton Woods regime (also referred to as the par value regime) and to serve as a source of
assistance for member states attempting to maintain the par value of their currencies. [26]The Bretton
Woods regime was the ﬁrst international legal system to govern the monetary relations of States, [27] a
two-tiered system of convertibility under which each national currency would be convertible either into
gold or into US dollars at a ﬁxed price, while at the same time the US dollar would be convertible into
gold at a ﬁxed price of 35 US dollars to one ounce of gold. Eventually, the regime that the IMF had
vowed to protect, collapsed in 1971, following a withdrawal by the United States under President Nixon
which held that the US dollar could no longer be the anchor of a global monetary system that from point
on would return to a regime of ﬂoating exchange rates. So, the IMF, deprived of its initial purpose,
had to re-establish its role in the global system. And it did, after undertaking a new mission to restore
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stability in the debt-stricken Latin American countries of the 1980s, discussed earlier. As a result, the
IMF evolved from a purely monetary institution to today's leading international ﬁnancial institution,
concerned over the last four decades with balance of payments diﬃculties of developing countries and
economies in transition, whatever their exchange rate arrangements may be. [26].
Figure 4.1: The IMF's headquarters in Washington
Source: http://clubofmozambique.com
4.1.1 IMF functions
According to its current Articles of Agreement, the three basic functions of the IMF are the following:
1. to act as the lender of last resort for states in need for Fund resources,
2. to monitor the macroeconomic policies of both the states and the respective ﬁnancial sectors, and
3. to provide advisory and technical assistance services to states.
4.2 IMF Conditionality
Under the 2002 revised IMF Guidelines on Conditionality, the Fund has laid out a set of predetermined
conditions for states wishing to gain access to its resources (hence, activate its lender of last resort
function), so as to eliminate phenomena of moral hazard, because otherwise states will be inclined to
embark on reckless expenditures, relying on the IMF's safety net (by analogy, it serves the same purpose
as ELA conditionality for banks). The three basic conditions are:
• the concerned state may only face temporary illiquidity problems,
• the debt of the state must be sustainable, and
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• most important of all, the disbursements of the loan tranches are conditional to strict adherence
to the reform program by the state, while the relevant progress is monitored through quarterly
reviews.
Apart from the abovementioned conditions explicitly provided in the Guidelines, one other factor of
major signiﬁcance that is linked to the second condition is that the loan granted by the IMF to the
state cannot undergo a haircut. The reasons are purely legal, as they derive from the provisions of the
IMF Articles of Agreement regarding the need for a sustainable debt. The IMF is not a private credit
institution that lives oﬀ proﬁt, since the funds that it grants does not belong to it, but are extracted
from the pooling of annual contributions made by the states (called quotas), according to each state's
ﬁscal standing. In fact, if i.e. Christine Lagarde were to grant a haircut on an IMF loan, she herself and
the rest of the IMF Board would be criminally prosecuted for doing so, as they lack the legal capacity to
decide on such a matter.
4.3 The IMF's role in the Eurozone crisis
In joint forces with the rest of the "Troikans", the IMF was involved in the rescue actions of the EU
to ﬁght the sovereign debt crisis that emerged end of 2009 in several euro area countries. The IMF
participated in the ﬁnancial assistance and economic adjustment programmes by contributing around
one third of the emergency funds, while also monitoring their progress (in the case of Italy, the IMF's
contribution was limited to the monitoring of the country's progress on improving its ﬁscal stance). Also,
it was because of the Eurozone crisis that the Fund introduced a new instrument, due to rising concerns
of leaders of the G-20 that the reserves of the IMF would not suﬃce because of the huge amounts it was
asked to lend, and that was the Precautionary And Liquidity Line (PLL), which pooled together extra
contributions from the EU NCBs with contributions coming from the international community.
The euro area crisis unveiled much of the EMU's legal, institutional and operational ineﬃciencies,
to which I have thoroughly referred in the relevant chapter (see Criticism and justiﬁcations for ECB
operations). So, the IMF was in a position to make a positive diﬀerence. Against the background of
consecutive failings in the banking sectors of several member states, the IMF was the one that ﬁrst
diagnosed the vicious circle of banking and sovereign debt, and for that matter it was the one that
sparkled the momentum for the 2012 initiative to set up the Banking Union. However, the IMF Board
Members did fail in terms of right timing, as they relied heavily on the false reassures of EU oﬃcials that
the crisis was only temporary and a minor one, and as a result Members of the Board did not realise the
real magnitude of the threat. Only after the publication of a 2009 report by its Staﬀ (the Global Financial
Stability Report) did the IMF oﬃcially push the Europeans to perform stress tests and recapitalizations
in the banking sector. As regards success, I believe that the IMF (joining forces with the ECB and the
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European Commission for the purposes of forming the Troika) did manage to eﬀectively resolve the major
crises in Spain, Ireland and Italy, where the respective banking sectors were stabilized and the state as
whole managed to successfully "graduate" from the reform programmes imposed, while the same thing
cannot be said for Portugal. And then, there's Greece, a case of its own.
4.4 The Greek predicament
Greece was the ﬁrst EMU country to receive Fund support. The ﬁrst signs of profound ﬁnancial
instability were the projections of the Greek Ministry of Finance concerning the state budget of 2009,
that revealed a giant leap by the deﬁcit-to GDP ratio from 3,5 to 12,5%. Responses, in the form of
the adoption of national measures by the Papandreou Administration plus the implementation of EU
monitoring, could not even ameliorate the situation. The gradual loss of conﬁdence by international
speculators in Greece's ﬁnancial standing led to the belief that the country would eventually go into
default. Such market reaction was highlighted, as always, by the exorbitant levels of Greek Government
spreads in the spring of 2010. It was apparent that Greece was now calling out for extreme rescue
measures 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Prime Minister Papandreou's IMF speech at Kastelorizo
Source: http://news247.gr
At ﬁrst instance, the participation of the IMF was opposed by EU oﬃcials, mostly by the ECB as a
matter of fact, on the basis that inter-EU mechanisms would solve the problem. My personal view echoes
the theory that for Eurozone (not EU in general) oﬃcials it was a matter of ego and prestige not to
allow the interference of a non-EU institution, that was established as a lender for either third-world or
in transition economies and not for a Western developed member state to a modern and recently-founded
regional monetary union. Adding to that point, talks within the IMF for the imposing of a haircut on
Greek debt (at that point Greece's debt was to the private sector, not to states or the IMF obviously)
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aroused Europeans even more, since recognizing the need for a haircut would imply that Greece was
carrying an unsustainable debt. This would be unthinkable for Eurozone oﬃcials to conceive, given that
the purpose of the Maastricht (or euro convergence) criteria - in particular the requirement for not
running deﬁcits of over 3% coupled with a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 60% - was to exclude any state
that would carry an unsustainable debt. So, signing up for a haircut on Greek Government debt would
suggest that Greece could no longer be a Eurozone member state.
So, how did we get from the initial unwillingness of both parties to cooperate - the IMF itself was
hesitant at ﬁrst because of its view that Greece's debt was unsustainable- to Prime Minister Papandreou's
infamous speech of April 23rd 2010, in the background of the Aegean blue at Kastelorizo, announcing
that he had bowed to the demands of the IMF (and the EU) to "give Greece a safe harbour"?
First of all, IMF involvement was a pre-condition for German chancellor Merkel to sign up for the (1st)
Greek rescue package. Secondly, the European Commission had no credibility and experience in handling
national ﬁscal problems, [28] while the IMF had to show for itself a reputation and an experience of
over 60 years of lending money and encouraging reforms. Thirdly, the United States (holding 17% of
the total voting rights within the Fund) pushed for IMF participation as it has always been in their own
best interest to stabilize Greece, a member of the NATO that is placed in a region of utmost geopolitical
importance and also hosts US military bases.
In the end, it was for these three reasons that both the Fund and the EU caved in and agreed on the 1st
ﬁnancial assistance programme for Greece, consisting of an 80-billion-euro loan from Eurozone member
states plus an additional 30-billion-euro loan (almost 3.200% of Greece's quota!) from the IMF.
4.4.1 The IMF's violation of its own mandate
I have already discussed the initial concerns of the IMF as to the unsustainability of Greek Government
debt, which served as a constraint for the granting of Fund resources, under its Guidelines on Condition-
ality. Nevertheless, Greece was given a 30-billion-euro loan for all the reasons mentioned in the previous
section, but also following a report by the IMF Board that predicted levels of expected growth and budget
surpluses as a result of the Fund's loan. So, the idea was that Greece may carry an unsustainable debt
at the time, but will eventually become sustainable through the program, based on predictions of future
growth and surpluses.
Unfortunately, in the summer of 2011 the projections of the IMF were discharged as growth levels did
not even resemble those predicted a year earlier. This is summoned up in an IMF Internal Audit Report
of 2016 ("Greece-Preliminary debt sustainability analysis- updated estimates and further considerations"),
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that discusses the input of erroneous data so as to reach equally false projections of future growth and
surpluses. The thing is that this was not a typical case of "coming up short", but there are signiﬁcant
legal implications. It is common knowledge that after a while, Fund members were subjected to severe
pressure (by either the United States, the EU whose members' combined voting rights within the IMF
reach 32%, or someone else) in order to participate in the rescue programmes. I wouldn't go so far as
to say that there was foul play or that the numbers were cooked intentionally, but in any case, the IMF,
strictly legally speaking, violated its own rule, that is to abstain from engaging in a loan agreement with




I have to admit that as I began my preliminary research, gathering all the relevant material, the variety
of topics that eventually would be covered was kind of a blur to me, so I decided to pick up stuﬀ that
bore signiﬁcance along the way. As a result, this paper addresses numerous issues -either at the core or
peripheral to the main subjects of sovereign debt and the ECB and IMF framework. So, at some point
readers might be urged to demand a greater degree of elaboration that unfortunately cannot be oﬀered
for the purposes of this paper.
In any case, I stressed out the general tendency of states -that lack printing privilege- to resort to
external funding either in the form of a loan or bond issuance, for reasons that I consider them to be
directly linked with politics (i.e. no Government that wants to remain in seat would be thrilled to impose
higher taxation). Furthermore, history has shown that accumulating more and more amounts of debt
resembles the mechanism of a ticking time bomb, as any Government would be willing to attract the
necessary funding, hoping that the consequences will not blow up in its face but in its successor's.
With regard to the Eurozone crisis, however, the setting was diﬀerent as huge gaps in public ﬁnances
grew from bail-out programmes in favour of the state's banking sector, highlighting the vicious circle of
sovereign-banking debt.
As for the arguments in support of the pivotal role of both the ECB and the IMF, it seems clear to
me that the euro area was caught oﬀ guard when the crisis broke out. So, there was a need to think and
act outside the box and "bend" some of the legal boundaries that otherwise would have prohibited the
extensive involvement of the two institutions.
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Having said that, I believe that the Eurozone has learned from failures of the past. Nowadays, the
appropriate tools are in place, in terms of regulation and institutionally, so it can be said that someday
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